DOCUMENT information
SECURITY CLASS. X
DOWNGRADED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DATE: 75/d   REVIEWER: ( ) — 9 July 1952

Chief of Station, Frankfurt
   Attention: ⌐   ⌐
Chief, EE

Approval of KIBITZ Field Project Outline

REF: MGKA-36225, MGFA-6537, FRAM 4106 (IN 13604)

1. At long last we are able to give you some information concerning the KIBITZ FPO. We can fully understand your concern about the necessary approval of this project and we regret the delay, the reasons for which will become apparent in the following paragraphs.

2. The KIBITZ project was approved as of 17 June 1952 for a temporary period through 30 September 1952, and retroactively to 1 January 1952. The maximum cost approved for this period was $29,350.

3. Extension of this project beyond 30 September 1952 was made dependent on the results of "a complete reassessment ..... in an effort to eliminate fundamental weaknesses which might militate against its use as a staybehind asset." Such reassessment is to be completed by 30 September.

4. You are doubtless familiar, by this time, with most of the factors which have caused officials here to be uncertain about the future of this project. By way of a review, however, your attention is called to the following points:

   a. The motivation and security aspects of KIBITZ 15 and the whole problem of our control - present and future - over this capable agent. Your attention is called to further details discussed in the following pouches: MOQW-14165, MCQW-13270, MGKW-7976, MOQW-14547, MOQW-13677, MGKW-11841, etc.

   b. The larger problem of our future control over both the KIBITZ 15 complex and the U. S.-sponsored portion of the KIBITZ program. Put briefly, the KIBITZ program was supposed to ensure a U. S.-oriented staybehind system in West Germany in the event that the ZIPPER staybehind program went down the drain. What assurances are there that we can count on either or both sides of

of the KIBITZ program in the event of hostilities? This question has, of course, particular significance with respect to the future loyalty of the K-15 complex.

c. Since there is a limited number of Commo circuits available, there is the feeling here that the number of actual future staybehind units should be limited to the number which can be serviced and, just as important, which can be reasonably counted on to activate themselves in the event of hostilities. Here again, the question is whether to count mainly on the strictly U. S. side of the KIBITZ program or on the K-15 side. This comes down primarily to the question, which teams to bet on?

d. The operational value, particularly with respect to important targets and enemy line of march, of the KIBITZ units. For example, should not more attention be given to the more strategic (and less expedient) location of reporting staybehind units? There is little use in having a unit located in Kassel, for instance, if the enemy is likely to enter 100 miles south of Kassel.

e. Training and tradecraft problems. E. g., what improvements can be made, what is being done now, etc.

5. Other more general problems have been outlined several times, notably in the following pouches: MGKW-12235, MGKW-12068, and MGKW-11766 (the most comprehensive document). The undersigned has recently written a fairly detailed critique of the staybehind program; this will also be made available to you after it has been discussed here this week. The same is true of a recent critique written as a final gesture by William E. Plaine.

6. Based on the above outline of the various problems and uncertainties, we would like to have you pouch us your own assessment of the KIBITZ program. This should be along fairly specific lines, both with regard to the problems, their suggested solutions, and specific recommendations for the manner in which the program should be continued in the future.